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This paper examines the impact of setting up new audit committees in Tunisian 
banks on their corporate governance. Specifically studied were the effects of the 
establishment of audit committees on boards of directors’ effectiveness, internal 
auditor independence, external auditor effort, and internal control and financial 
reporting quality. The interview and survey methods were used to collect data from 
board members and the internal and external auditors of eight Tunisian banks 
shortly after they introduced audit committees on their boards. The main findings 
show that the establishment of new audit committees influences the breadth of the 
directors’ discussions during board meetings. In some of the banks studied, the new 
audit committees improve the internal auditors’ independence from top 
management, internal controls and financial reporting quality, and/or result in less 
effort by external auditors. Some of the interviewed external auditors view the new 
audit committees as a valuable governance mechanism, especially in cases of 
disagreement with management. 
1. Introduction and context 
In recent years, the Tunisian banking industry has undergone major reforms as 
part of the process of financial liberalization and deregulation of the sector. This 
phenomenon, which has an international orientation, implies a greater role of the 
financial market, a decrease in public supervision over banking activities, and 
greater freedom granted to managers. However, financial liberalization in Tunisia is 
accompanied by an attempt to reinforce the prudential supervision of banks in order 
to control their risk management. This is mainly because of the important economic 
role of banks in financing, the delicate nature of the banking business (the specificity 
of its assets and liabilities), and the banking crises in similar emerging economies 
like Malaysia and Indonesia. 
In this context, several measures are taken to strengthen internal control 
mechanisms, in particular the standard for the internal control system of banks 
(Tunisian accounting standard No. 22). This standard recommends the establishment 
of audit committees attached to boards of directors in banking institutions. More 
recently, Central Bank Circular No. 2011-06, Improving Corporate Governance in 
Financial Institutions, recommends that banks implement audit committees as a 
signal of good governance practices. 
At the international level, the audit committee is strongly recognized as a key 
element in the corporate governance system (Dellaportas et al., 2012, Ghafran and 
O’Sullivan, 2013, Agyemang-Mintah and Schadewitz, 2018). In fact, the adoption 
and use of audit committees is the subject of numerous recommendations in the 
context of professional reports or regulatory commissions (Treadway, 1987, 
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Cadbury, 1992, Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC), 1999, Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), 
2002, etc.). Moreover, a panoply of empirical research investigates different issues 
related to audit committees (see Carcello et al. (2011) for a review of this literature). 
However, the research on corporate governance of banks and particularly audit 
committees remains an underemphasized area, especially in emerging markets 
(Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). Therefore, given the importance of audit 
committees as a governance mechanism, it is relevant to examine the effects of the 
establishment of audit committees on Tunisian banks. The purpose of this article is 
to investigate the potential impact of the establishment of the audit committee on 
several elements of corporate governance of Tunisian banks. In particular, these 
aspects relate to the board of directors’ effectiveness, relationships with internal and 
external auditors, financial reporting quality, and internal control quality. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the main 
theories that explain the role of audit committees. Section 3 develops the research 
propositions. Section 4 describes the research method. Section 5 presents a summary 
of the results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Theoretical foundations of audit committees 
2.1. Agency Theory 
The separation of control/ownership in the modern organization creates 
conflicting interests between shareholders and managers. According to agency 
theory, the shareholders act as the principal and delegate the management of their 
companies to the managers (agents). However, the latter do not often act in the 
interest of shareholders, hence the need for a control system of managers. This 
demand for control can be achieved by the use of audits (Wallace, 1980), the 
appointment of outside directors (Fama and Jensen, 1983), and the setting up of the 
audit committee. Pincus et al. (1989) argue that audit committees are voluntarily 
employed in situations of high agency costs to improve the quality of information 
flow from the agent to the principal. Accordingly, audit committees are seen as a 
control mechanism designed to reduce agency costs and informational asymmetry 
(Kalbers and Fogarty, 1998). From this perspective, research on audit committees 
intends mainly to determine the characteristics of the companies that voluntarily 
introduce this committee. These studies have examined the association between the 
audit committee and different variables, for example: agency costs of equity and 
debt and the quality of external audits (Collier, 1996, Collier and Gregory, 1999, 
Turley and Zaman, 2002). However, this literature finds mixed results, suggesting 
that reducing agency costs is not the only incentive for audit committee 
establishment (Turley and Zaman, 2002). 
2.2. Institutional Theory 
Researchers have examined the implementation of audit committees from an 
institutional perspective because of the weak explanatory power of agency theory 
(Kalbers and Fogarty, 1998, Zaman, 2002). Institutional theory, dating back to the 
1980s (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983), is based on the fact that organizations adopt 
new measures in response to external expectations. The institutional perspective 
suggests that organizations are making changes in their structures and practices in 
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the quest for legitimacy and compliance rather than the realization of expected 
benefits (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1998). In accounting research, for example, 
institutional theory has been used to examine accounting as a symbol of legitimacy. 
From this perspective, the audit committee, like accounting, can influence and be 
influenced by a variety of agents, institutions, and processes (Zaman, 2002). Sources 
of normative pressure on organizations come from the State, regulatory bodies and 
the profession. This perspective highlights the role of professional and regulatory 
bodies in promoting audit committees (Zaman, 2002). 
3. Research Propositions 
The audit committee is a standing committee of the board of directors of a 
company, often composed of outside directors and responsible for matters related to 
financial reporting and auditing (Spira, 1999). In particular, the responsibilities of 
this committee include three areas often mentioned in the literature (Verschoor 
1993, Wolnizer 1995, Dellaportas et al., 2012): oversight of the financial statement 
preparation process, oversight of the internal audit function and the internal control 
system, and the supervision of the external auditor. In this paper, I propose to 
examine the effect of the establishment of the audit committee on the effectiveness 
of the board of directors, internal control and financial reporting quality, internal 
auditor independence, and the external auditor effort. 
3.1. Audit committees and of board of directors effectiveness 
The role of the board of directors is very important in banks. Macey and 
O’Hara (2003) note that the nature of the bank makes this organization susceptible 
to greater moral hazards than industrial firms. In addition, the opacity of the balance 
sheet of banks and the existence of several regulatory measures, such as deposit 
insurance, weaken depositors’ need to control the risk-taking behavior of managers. 
They place a great responsibility on the board of directors to control managers and 
safeguard the social interest. 
More freedom is afforded to managers in their decision-making because of the 
deregulation and liberalization of the banking sector (Kole and Lehn, 1997). It turns 
out that the duty of control of managers is more important for the board of directors 
of a bank. The establishment of an additional control mechanism may be of great 
help to the board in carrying out its responsibilities. In this regard, the audit 
committee may assist the board of directors in its responsibilities including the 
preparation of financial statements, the evaluation of internal control, the risk 
management system and the oversight of internal and external auditors. 
Abbott and Parker (2000) argue that forming an audit committee can alleviate 
the work of outside directors in two ways. On the one hand, outside directors, non-
members of the audit committee, can discharge their fiduciary duties by relying on 
the audit committee’s opinions on the financial statements. On the other hand, the 
independence and integrity of controls can be improved, since the external and 
internal auditors report to a subset of the board made up only of outside directors. 
Particularly, the board of directors of a bank is responsible not only to the 
shareholders but also to the regulatory authorities. It has to ensure the quality of 
disclosed financial information. 
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In this study, I focus on the frequency and duration of board meetings, as well 
as the topics discussed during these meetings. Therefore, I propose that: 
Proposition 1: The presence of an audit committee improves the effectiveness of 
the board of directors. 
3.2. Audit committees and financial reporting quality 
One of the major responsibilities assigned to the audit committee is the oversight 
of the financial reporting process. The importance of this role is recognized and 
demonstrated by a large number of proponents, either professionals or regulatory 
bodies (Treadway, 1987, BRC, 1999, SOX, 2002, Smith report, 2003, etc.). 
Studies examining the link between the audit committee and the financial 
reporting process indicate that the presence of an audit committee contributes 
significantly to the improvement of financial reporting quality. For this purpose, 
Dechow et al. (1996) demonstrate that companies subject to SEC sanctions for 
accounting violations are less likely to have an audit committee. McMullen (1996) 
demonstrates that the existence of an audit committee is associated with a lower 
frequency of errors and irregularities in the financial statements. More recently, Piot 
and Janin (2007) and Baxter and Cotter (2009) show that the presence of an audit 
committee improves the quality of financial reporting measured by abnormal 
accounting accruals. 
Considering the empirical results for non-financial firms, I expect that 
establishing an audit committee will have a positive effect on the quality of the 
financial statements of a bank. Since a bank is required to submit its financial 
statements to a larger number of users, including regulatory authorities, the presence 
of the audit committee – the eye overseeing the entire process – would eventually 
reduce errors, whether intentional or not, in the financial statements. Therefore, I 
propose that: 
Proposition 2: The presence of an audit committee minimizes the risk of errors 
in the financial statements. 
3.3. Audit committees and internal auditor independence 
The oversight of the internal audit is one of the major responsibilities assigned 
to the audit committee. In fact, the internal auditor is of great importance to banks. 
For instance, the presence of an internal auditor in banks is associated with fewer 
claims for rectification in reports, fewer regulatory violations and a higher 
probability of detection of employee fraud (Noland and Flesher, 2003). 
The internal auditor must be independent and objective to perform effectively 
(Christopher et al., 2009). However, the CEO is the hierarchical superior of the 
internal auditor; thus, the latter is in a conflictual situation (BRC, 1999, Christopher 
et al., 2009). The audit committee can improve the independence of the internal 
auditor by being an appropriate context for the disclosure of any weaknesses 
discovered in the company’s internal management (Braiotta, 1999). The interaction 
between the audit committee and the internal auditor is reflected in other actions that 
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may also provide a minimum of independence, including: overseeing the 
appointment and dismissal process of the internal auditor, meetings with the auditor, 
review of proposals and internal audit results, and private access to the internal 
auditor (Raghunandan et al, 2001, Christopher et al., 2009). Private meetings allow 
the latter to express themselves freely and independently of leaders and to 
pronounce on weaknesses, particularly involving leaders (Braiotta, 1999, Christoper 
et al., 2009). Therefore, I propose that: 
Proposition 3: The presence of an audit committee enhances the independence 
of the internal audit function. 
3.4. Audit committees and internal control quality 
The BRC Report (1999), the Smith Report (2003), as well as SOX (2002) argue 
that one of the most important responsibilities of the audit committee is to ensure 
that an effective system of internal controls is designed and applied in the company. 
Moreover, the setting up of an audit committee in the banks is recommended as a 
solution to the difficulties that the board of directors may encounter, in order to 
ensure the existence and maintenance of an appropriate control system (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2001). 
In addition, the existence of an audit committee can be an indicator of the 
internal control quality (Collier, 1996). In fact, the audit committee is likely to 
improve the effectiveness of internal controls by overseeing internal and external 
audit work. In this sense, the results of Abbott et al. (2010) suggest that the focus 
of the internal audit function on internal control activities increases significantly if 
the audit committee supervises this function. The empirical results of Krishnan 
(2005) as well as Pridgen and Wang (2012) indicate that companies that have an 
audit committee are less likely to have problems of internal control. Therefore, I 
propose that: 
3.5. Audit committees and external auditor effort 
The audit committee can be involved in the appointment, change and 
compensation of external auditors, the content and scope of the audit program, as 
well as the independence of the auditor and the resolution of any disagreement 
between auditors and managers. Moreover, the rationale behind the 
recommendations for the establishment of audit committees was often the audit 
failures revealed in external auditor work (Turley and Zaman, 2002). Better 
governance of the client permits a higher likelihood of accepting the client, lower 
risk assessment of the control environment, fewer substantive tests, and more 
interim testing (Sharma et al., 2008). Cohen et al. (2002) show that 75% of the 
surveyed external auditors point out that their discussions with the audit committee 
or the board have the greatest impact on the audit risk assessment and on the audit 
planning. These discussions may reveal several risk areas that will affect the 
planning program in terms of the audit scope. Furthermore, the audit committee is a 
crucial element of the control environment and its presence signals to the auditors a 
reduced control risk (Collier, 1996, Stewart and Munro, 2007). As a result, the 
establishment of an audit committee ensures better control, a reduction of control 
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risk and audit risk more generally, thus reducing the external auditor effort 
(Bradbury et al., 2003). Therefore, I propose that: 
Proposition 5: The presence of an audit committee reduces the external 
auditor’s effort. 
4. Research Method 
Wacheux (1996) points out that the case study is applicable when the research 
question begins with “why” or “how”. This research examines how the 
establishment of the audit committee has an impact on different components of a 
bank’s governance. The case study is therefore an appropriate research strategy. 
This method is also recommended when the research question is exploratory, which 
is the case for this study (Yin, 1994). 
4.1. Selection of cases 
Of interest for this research were Tunisian banks that have established audit 
committees. Questionnaires were sent to internal audit managers (i.e. internal 
auditors) of Tunisian banks. The results of the survey indicate that twelve Tunisian 
banks have established an audit committee. They were contacted and eight banks 
agreed to participate in the study. To maintain confidentiality, the names of these 
banks are replaced with letters (A–H). 
4.2. Operationalization of concepts 
Board of directors’ effectiveness: This concept is measured by the frequency 
and duration of board meetings and the topics discussed during these meetings. 
Financial reporting quality: The external auditor is responsible for providing 
an opinion on the regularity and fairness of the financial statements. He is required 
to communicate to management and to the board the errors and 
irregularities/misstatements that he noticed when auditing the financial statements, 
to make the necessary adjustments. The frequency of misstatements detected in the 
financial statements may be an appropriate measure of the quality of the financial 
information produced, considering the independence of the external auditor 
(Archambeault et al., 2008, Cullinan et al., 2008). The presence of the audit 
committee reduces the likelihood of financial statement anomalies and thus 
improves the financial reporting quality (McMullen, 1996). 
Internal auditor independence: The main factors that determine the 
independence of the internal auditor are the organizational status of the internal 
auditor, as well as the degree of managers’ involvement in the work of the internal 
auditor (Chapman, 2001, IIA, 1110). 
Internal control quality: The quality of the internal control system is proxied by 
the frequency of problems in the design or application of internal control procedures 
(Pridgen and Wang, 2012). This proxy is complemented by the external auditor’s 
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assessment of the quality of the internal control before and after the establishment of 
the audit committee. Krishnan (2005) uses a similar measure in his study. 
External auditor effort: Some studies use the fees of the external auditor to 
measure the extent of audit effort (Abbott et al. 2006; Badertscher et al., 2014). 
However, the audit fees in Tunisia are fixed by a scale. The number of planned 
audit hours would be a more appropriate measure of audit effort. This measure is 
used by many studies examining the impact of corporate governance mechanisms 
on audit effort (e.g., Bradbury et al., 2003; Bedard and Johnstone, 2004; Stewart 
and Munro, 2007). 
4.3. Data collection and analysis 
For the purpose of this study, three sources of evidence were used: disclosed 
information, documentation, interviews, and surveys. The utilization of several data 
sources allows triangulation, which is a corroboration procedure of the data’s 
validity (Patton, 1999). 
The documentation included agendas, minutes, audit committee charters, and 
memos. These documents include information about the main characteristics of the 
audit committee, as well as the activity and responsibilities of the committee. 
Disclosed information included data published by the TSE (Tunis Stock 
Exchange) and the financial statements and annual reports. The information 
collected was mainly about the characteristics of the banks studied (total assets, 
capital structure, nature of activities, external auditors, etc.). 
The documentation analysis did not provide a thorough picture of the audit 
committee’s effects on a bank’s governance. Accordingly, structured interviews 
were conducted with the internal audit managers and the external auditor of each 
bank. To this end, an interview guide was developed based on the research 
objectives and the literature review. To ensure the rigor and relevance of the 
questions asked, a pilot test was conducted by submitting the interview guide to two 
internal audit managers. The interviews lasted from 30 minutes to 1 hour 30 
minutes. In addition, questionnaires were sent to the secretaries general of the boards 
because it was difficult to schedule an interview with them. In total, 16 people were 
interviewed and questionnaires were completed by 6 persons. Interviews and 
questionnaires focused on: 
• Changes that occurred in the functions studied (internal audit, board of 
directors, external audit) after the establishment of the audit committee. 
• The relationship of the participants interviewed with the audit committee. 
• The activity of the audit committee. 
To analyze the data collected, the states of the variables studied before and after 
the implementation of the audit committee in each bank were compared. Moreover, 
a comparative analysis was performed between the eight banks and insights from the 
study participants were aggregated. 
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5. Research results 
5.1. Banks and audit committees studied 
This section describes the banks involved in this study and presents the 
characteristics of the audit committees they established. 
5.1.1. Bank characteristics 
Eight Tunisian banks agreed to participate in the study. Six banks are in the 
private sector and two in the public sector. Moreover, six are commercial banks, one 
a development bank, and one an offshore bank. In addition, six institutions are listed 
on the Tunis Stock Exchange. Two are large banks (A and E1) and four are medium 
sized banks (B, C, D and H2). Except one bank (C), all banks are audited by the big 
4 audit firms. Five banks from the private sector and one from the public sector are 
characterized by concentrated ownership. The ownership is considered to be 
concentrated if the shareholder holds 50% or more of the bank’s capital. This proxy 
is used by Kobeissi (2004) in his study on banks in the North African region. 
5.1.2. Audit committee characteristics 
The information about characteristics of the audit committees, as detailed in 
Table 1, was collected from internal documents (agendas from audit committee 
meetings, charters, etc.). The audit committee composition varies from one bank to 
another. The audit committee size is between 3 and 6 members. Based on the 
criterion of the independence of audit committee members, the banks can be 
classified into three groups: group 1 includes committees which are entirely formed 
by executives of the company (A and B), group 2 is where the CEO is a member of 
the audit committee (C) and finally, group 3 consists of committees formed entirely 
by non-executive external directors (D, E, F, G, H). The audit committees of group 1 
meet twice a year. In groups 2 and 3, the audit committees meet four times a year. 
These findings suggest that audit committees are probably more active in groups 2 










A ⁃ Supervisory directory 
⁃ General inspector 
⁃ Internal audit manager 
⁃ Computer audit manager 
Twice ⁃ Approval of the annual program of internal 
audits and inspections. 
⁃ Decision-making regarding the 
recommendations of audit reports. 
⁃ Examination of the main audit conclusions. 
⁃ Follow-up of the recommendations of the audit 
reports. 
⁃ Follow-up of the annual program of audits and 
inspections. 
B ⁃ CEO 
⁃ General inspector 
⁃ Risk manager 
Twice ⁃ Establishment of the annual audit plan. 
⁃ Follow up on audit and inspection 
recommendations. 
C ⁃ CEO 
⁃ Three affiliated directors 
Four ⁃ Review of any document to be provided to the 
Tunisian Central Bank, to the public, etc. 
⁃ Review of the internal audit report. 
⁃ Examination of the evolution of the bank’s 
situation. 
⁃ Examination of forecasts. 
D ⁃ Tunisian director non-executive 
⁃ Two directors representing the 
foreign majority shareholder 
⁃ Audit committee could rely on 
internal or external consultants 
Four ⁃ Evaluation of the internal control system. 
⁃ Approval of the internal audit plan. 
⁃ Review of annual and periodic financial reports. 
⁃ Selection of the external auditor. 
⁃ Evaluation of the internal auditor’s work. 
⁃ Verification of compliance with regulations. 
E ⁃ Vice–president of supervisory 
board 
⁃ One representative of Ministry 
of Finance 
⁃ Two representatives of a public 
institution 
Four ⁃ Review of quarterly financial statements. 
⁃ Examination of internal control procedures. 
F ⁃ Three Tunisian directors 
⁃ Three directors from the country 
shareholder 
Twice ⁃ Approval of the annual audit plan. 
⁃ Discussion of the deficiencies identified by the 
internal audit report. 
⁃ Discussion of the external auditor’s report on 
internal control procedures. 
⁃ Follow up on auditor recommendations. 
⁃ Evaluation of particular accounting choices. 
⁃ Selection of the external auditor. 
G ⁃ Board chairman 
⁃ Two external directors 
⁃ Internal auditor (as secretary) 
⁃ Two managers 
Four ⁃ Review of internal audit reports. 
⁃ Review of external auditor recommendations. 
⁃ Approval of the annual internal audit plan. 
⁃ Review of particular accounts (provisions, 
guarantees, foreign exchange loss) 
H ⁃ Board chairman 
⁃ Two external directors 
Four ⁃ Review of the reports of the control 
department. 
⁃ Review of financial statements. 
⁃ Approval of the annual internal audit plan. 
Regarding the responsibilities of audit committees, as described in Table 2, the 
supervision of the internal audit function (approval of the annual internal audit plan, 
review of internal audit results and follow up of the internal auditor 
recommendations) is a common task of all the audit committees studied. For the 
other duties, the percentages are variable; for example, 75% of audit committees are 
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responsible for reviewing annual and quarterly financial statements and 62% of 
audit committees are responsible for reviewing and following up on the external 
auditor recommendations. These different responsibilities are formalized in the audit 
committee charter at one bank (bank D). In the other banks, they are included in the 
minutes of the board of directors approval of the establishment of the audit 
committee, by a memo or by a directive of the bank. 
Table 2. Responsibilities of audit committees. 
Responsibilities Percentage of audit committees 
Approval of the annual internal audit plan 100% 
Review of the results of the internal audit work 100% 
Follow-up of corrective actions proposed by the internal auditor 100% 
Assessment of effectiveness of the internal control system 87.5% 
Review of quarterly and annual financial statements  75% 
Review and follow-up of external auditor recommendations 62.5% 
Verification of compliance with regulations in effect 28.5% 
5.2. Interview and survey results 
5.2.1. Audit committees and effectiveness of the board of directors 
Information about the activity of the board of directors (the number and 
duration of meetings) was obtained from the questionnaires sent to the secretaries 
general of the board. As regards the topics discussed during board meetings, the 
questionnaire provided secretaries with a list of possible subjects to discuss and 
asked them to rate the time allocation to selected topics (before and after the 
establishment of the audit committee). 
For all banks, the comparison of the frequency and duration of board meetings, 
before and after the establishment of the audit committee, did not reveal any 
variations. The majority of boards meet 4 times a year and the duration of these 
meetings varies between 2 and 4 hours. Moreover, the main topics discussed during 
board meetings focus on reviewing and approving financial statements, strategic 
planning, managing key risks and evaluating the institution’s current performance. 
However, in some banks, the time allocated and the nature of these themes changed 
after the establishment of the audit committee. For instance, the board of directors of 
bank D devoted more time to strategic issues compared to the review of the financial 
statements and the assessment of the company’s current performance, after the 
establishment of the audit committee. This committee gives the board a minimum of 
assurance regarding the reliability of the financial statements prepared. In addition, 
the establishment of the audit committee enables the boards of banks F and G to 
address new topics, for example, internal control quality, by consulting the minutes 
of the audit committee. In sum, for banks D, F and G, the audit committee is a 
committee that prepares the work for the board of directors in reviewing the 
financial statements and provides it with a minimum of assurance on the 
effectiveness of the internal control in place. For banks A and B, being composed of 
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non-directors, the audit committee had no direct effect on the effectiveness of the 
board of directors.3 
5.2.2. Audit committees and financial reporting quality 
The information about financial reporting quality was essentially collected 
from the interview with the external auditor of each bank. The analysis of this data 
shows that the audit committees of banks A and B are not involved in the review of 
the financial statements. The audit committees of the other banks pay variable 
attention to the review of the financial statements. For example, the audit 
committees of banks E and G are interested in examining several balance sheet 
items that they consider important. Audit committee members of bank E scrutinize 
client resources, the deposit structure, and changes in net income, while those of 
bank G examine guarantees, provisions, and foreign exchange losses. Other 
committees (banks C, D, F and H) are responsible for reviewing the 
recommendations of the external auditor related to the financial statements. 
However, this particular interest in the financial statements has no significant 
effect on the quality of the financial information produced. The second proposition 
about the positive effect of the presence of audit committees on financial reporting 
quality is not confirmed. The frequency of misstatements/errors discovered in 
financial statements by the external auditor did not change significantly after the 
establishment of the audit committee, except in bank E. This result can be explained 
by the lack of financial literacy of the audit committee members and the inactivity of 
the audit committee in some cases. In fact, as the GAO survey (1991) points out, the 
accounting expertise of members is a key factor in obtaining more reliable financial 
statements for banks. 
5.2.3. Audit committees and internal auditor independence 
Information about the elements that determine internal auditor independence 
was gathered from the interview with the internal audit manager of each bank. These 
elements include the appointment of the internal audit manager, the hierarchical 
superior of the internal audit manager, the approval of the charter and the annual 
internal audit plan, and the channels of communication between the audit committee 
and the internal audit manager. 
Internal audit is a division under the supervision of top management in 5 out of 8 
banks. Moreover, the appointment, dismissal and remuneration of the internal audit 
manager remains exclusively within the remit of top management even after the 
establishment of the audit committee. Only the audit committee of bank D 
participates in such decisions. As regards the functional relationship, the internal 
audit manager reports his results to top management and the audit committee in three 
banks (D, F and G). However, it continues to report only to top management even in 
the presence of the audit committee in the other banks. In addition, the approval of 
the annual internal audit program is attributed to the audit committee in all banks 
while the approval of the internal audit charter is assigned to top management (A and 
C) and the audit committee (F and G).4 Finally, the internal audit manager 
participates in audit committees meetings in 4 cases (D, E, F and G). He has private 
meetings with audit committee members5 in only two banks (D and G). These 
findings suggest that top management still has control on the internal audit function, 
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even after the establishment of the audit committee, both hierarchically and 
functionally in 6 out of 8 cases. According to the internal audit managers of these 
banks, this result can be explained by the resistance of top managers to the direct 
relationship between the internal auditor and the audit committee. 
However, in banks D and G, the independence of the internal audit manager is 
improved because the internal audit manager can communicate directly with the audit 
committee which participates in the appointment and change of the internal audit 
manager. Moreover, the private meetings organized with audit committee members 
allow the internal audit manager to express his opinions freely, away from the 
pressures that could be exerted by managers. This is not the case for other banks, 
where internal audit reports go through top management before being reviewed by the 
audit committee. 
Table 3. Independence of internal audit manager. 
 Before audit committee 
establishment (number 
of banks) 
After audit committee 
establishment 
Hierarchical superior of internal audit manager   
- Top management 7 5 
- General inspection 1 (A) 2 (A, B) 
- Control department  1 (H) 
Appointment, dismissal and remuneration of 
internal audit manager 
  
- Top management 7 7 
- Top management and board of directors 1(D)  
- Top management and audit committee  1(D) 
Internal audit manager reports directly to   
- Top management 7 5 
- Top management and board of directors 1 (D)  
- Top management and audit committee  2 (D et F) 
- Audit committee  1 (G) 
Approval of internal audit charter   
- Top management 4 2 (A et C) 
- Audit committee  2 (F et G) 
Approval of annual planning of internal audit   
- Top management 8  
- Audit committee  8 
Communication between internal audit manager 
and audit committee 
  
- Attending audit committee meetings   
- Yes NA 4 
- No  NA 4 
- Private meetings   
- Yes NA 6 
- No NA 2 (D et G) 
NA: not applicable 
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5.2.4. Audit committees and internal control quality 
In the majority of the banks studied, the audit committee evaluates the internal 
control system by consulting the internal control report, reviewing the internal 
audit reports, as well as reviewing the recommendations of the external auditor on 
internal controls. 
The different elements of the impact of the audit committee on internal control 
quality were gathered from the interviews with the internal audit manager and with 
the external auditor of each bank. The results indicate that the presence of the audit 
committee is associated with a greater detection of internal control weaknesses in 
three cases (banks A, D and G). This result can be explained by the fact that the 
establishment of the audit committee allowed the internal audit manager to be more 
efficient in his work. In fact, according to the internal audit managers of these banks, 
the establishment of the audit committee is accompanied by closer monitoring of the 
internal audit activity and greater attention to its recommendations from top 
management. The auditor is prompted to conduct more effective audits. In addition, 
the internal and external auditors of 4 banks (A, B, D and G) consider the presence 
of the audit committee to have allowed a more regular and rigorous follow-up of the 
audit recommendations relating to weaknesses in internal control. 
In other banks (B, C, E, G and H), the presence of the audit committee has no 
effect on the number of the problems detected in internal control procedures. The 
internal audit managers of these banks consider that the limited effect of the audit 
committee on internal control quality is caused by the lack of power given to 
internal audit managers to implement the recommendations intended to strengthen 
this internal control system. In addition, the internal control processes in place suffer 
from several shortcomings, including the absence of a written procedures manual. 
As a result, the control culture at these banks remains relatively weak. 
5.2.5. Audit committees and external auditor effort 
Three main findings come out of the analysis of the interviews with the 
external auditor of each bank. The first result is consistent with proposition 5, i.e., in 
the presence of the audit committee, the external auditor reduces the scope of its 
planned audit effort. In fact, the planned audit effort (in hours) decreased for three 
banks (E, F and G) after the establishment of the audit committee. According to the 
external auditors of these banks, this result can be explained by the fact that they 
rely on audit committees to identify potential risk areas. 
Second, the auditors of banks D, F and H consider the audit committee as a 
supporter in case of potential disagreements with management. In such situations, 
the audit committee takes an impartial position and tries to solve the problem, or in 
other cases, it supports the opinion of the external auditor. The audit committee is 
considered an indispensable governance mechanism, facilitating the implementation 
of the auditor’s recommendations. 
Third, the presence of audit committees in Banks A, B and C did not have any 
effect on the conduct of the audit engagement. Planned audit hours did not change 
after the establishment of the committee. The external auditors considered these 
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committees ineffective as a control mechanism. In addition, communication between 
the audit committee and the auditor was absent, unlike the other banks where a 
minimum of communication was established, whether formally (banks D, F, G and 
H) or informally (bank E). The auditors of banks D, F, G and H participate 
occasionally or at all audit committee meetings, to present the audit results and 
communicate the auditor’s recommendations on the financial statements. 
In sum, audit committees are more effective in some banks than in other banks. 
Indeed, the simple existence of the audit committee does not guarantee its 
effectiveness (Menon and Williams, 1994; Dellaportas et al., 2012). Its impact can be 
moderated by several factors. The next section identifies the elements that explain the 
lack of effectiveness of the audit committee in fulfilling its role in some banks. 
5.2.6. Additional results and discussion 
The results, described above, indicate that in some of the banks studied, the 
audit committee has limited effects on internal auditor independence, and financial 
reporting and internal control quality. Possible explanations of this finding can be 
identified based on the collected opinions of the internal and external auditors of 
these banks. 
The interviewed participants noticed that the newly established audit 
committees in some of these banks lack independence and competence. For 
instance, audit committee members of banks A and B are employees of the bank, 
which can explain the committee’s lack of independence and ineffectiveness. In 
bank C, top managers are members of the audit committee. This puts pressure on the 
external auditor who is expected to provide an unbiased opinion on the quality of the 
financial statements and the internal control system. The external auditor of this 
bank considers the audit committee to be ineffective and that its establishment has 
no beneficial effects on the internal control system and the reliability of the financial 
statements. In other cases (banks G and H, for example), the committee members do 
not have the required skills, especially accounting competencies, to fulfill their role. 
Moreover, the study participants recognized other factors that may have triggered 
the lack of effectiveness of audit committees such as: the little power attributed to 
the audit committee, the small number of committee meetings, the unavailability of 
committee members, the lack of information provided to the committee members, 
and the weak internal control environment. 
Taken together, these results raise questions about the real desire of these banks 
to improve their governance systems. They may have introduced audit committees 
just to respond to increasing institutional pressures from either regulatory authorities 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































n: year of audit committee establishment 
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6. Conclusion 
The objective of this research is to investigate the impact of the implementation 
of new audit committees in eight Tunisian banks on their governance. In particular, 
the effects of new audit committees on boards of directors’ effectiveness, internal 
auditor independence, external auditor effort, and internal control and financial 
reporting quality were examined. 
The main results indicate that the establishment of new audit committees 
influences the breadth of the directors’ discussions during board meetings. In some 
of the banks studied, the new audit committees improve the internal auditor’s 
independence from top management, internal control and financial reporting quality, 
and/or results in less effort by the external auditor. Some of the interviewed external 
auditors view the new audit committees as a valuable governance mechanism, 
especially in cases of disagreement with management. Overall, the audit committees 
of banks D, E, F, G and H (group 3) are reasonably effective in fulfilling their 
monitoring role of the internal audit function, the financial reporting process, and the 
internal control system. In the remaining banks A, B and C (groups 1 and 2), audit 
committees are ineffective. The lack of effectiveness of these committees is 
essentially triggered by the lack of independence and competence of its members. 
The study has limitations. First, the case study methodology is open to 
subjectivity from the researcher when interpreting the perceptions collected from the 
different participants. Second, the audit committee members were not interviewed, 
which limits the study’s insights about audit committees’ meetings. 
Potential avenues for future research include investigating the reasons behind 
the absence of audit committees in other Tunisian banks (for example, the 
hypothesis of management entrenchment). It would also be interesting to study the 
effectiveness of audit committees in non-financial industries. In addition, the 
research method and results of this study could be insightful to researchers interested 
in examining the effectiveness of audit committees in other emerging countries. 
Finally, it would be worthwhile to investigate the substitutability and/or 
complementarity between the audit committee and other governance mechanisms in 
the banking sector. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 The size of the bank (measured by the total assets) is between 2000 (million 
Tunisian dinars) and 4000 MTD. 





3 For banks C and E, the audit committee did not have an impact on any aspect of 
the board of directors’ effectiveness (frequency/duration of meetings and topics 
discussed). 
4 4 banks don’t have an internal audit charter. 
5 Without the presence of top managers. 
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